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Executive Summary 
Contrary to media depictions of sub-Saharan Africa, in many countries political change has tended 
to occur gradually. From 2015 to 2019, the general pattern has been for the continent’s more 
authoritarian states – such as Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, and Rwanda – to make little 
progress towards democracy and in some cases to become incrementally more repressive. At the 
same time, many of the continent’s more democratic states – including Botswana, Ghana, 
Mauritius, Senegal, and South Africa – have remained “consolidating” or “defective” democracies, 
with very few dropping out of these categories to become “authoritarian” regimes. Overall, only 16 
countries saw their ranking in any one of the categories between the last two rounds of the BTI: 
this represents just 12% all cases, given that the BTI reviews 44 countries across three main 
categories. The main exceptions to this rule are countries that have suffered a rapid escalation of 
conflict (such as South Sudan in 2013), or the sudden collapse of the government (such as Burkina 
Faso in 2015). 
The current reporting period from February 2017 to January 2019 also saw significant, if not 
transformative, developments in a number of states including Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe – although in few of these cases was here a 
change to the underlying character of the political system. While Cameroon, Chad, Kenya and 
Tanzania have moved further away from lasting political and economic transformation, Angola, 
Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe initially appeared to be making progress towards it. 
However, in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe this impression did not last beyond the end of the BTI 
reporting period, and the new governments of both countries now stand accused of committing 
similar human rights abuses to their predecessors. 
As this brief overview suggests, at a continental level the trajectories of different states have by 
and large cancelled each other out. Positive trends in some cases were wiped out by negative 
trends in others. Consequently, sub-Saharan Africa as a whole has witnessed no significant 
changes to the overall level of democracy, economic management and governance – the three 
main areas of performance covered in this report. Between BTI 2018 and BTI 2020 the overall 
level of democracy declined by just -0.04, a small shift on a 1-10 scale. There was an identical 
change in the status of economic transformation, and an even smaller shift in the average quality 
of governance of +0.01. Overall, these figures demonstrate remarkable continuity at the continental 
level.  
In almost all cases, positive trends were recorded in countries where leadership change generated 
hope for political renewal and economic reform. This includes Angola, after President José 
Eduardo dos Santos stepped down in 2017, Ethiopia, following the rise to power of Prime Minister 
Abiy, and Zimbabwe, where the transfer of power from Robert Mugabe to Emmerson Mnangagwa 
was accompanied with promises that in future the ZANU-PF government would demonstrate 
greater respect democratic norms and values. Sierra Leone also recorded a significant 
improvement in performance following the victory of opposition candidate Julius Maada Bio in the 
presidential election of 2018, while Nigeria has continued to make modest but significant gains in 
economic management since Muhammadu Buhari replaced Goodluck Jonathan as President. The 
significance of leadership change to all of these processes is an important reminder of the extent to 
which power has been personalized in many African states. It is important to note, however, that 
subsequent events since the end of the period under review in 2019 have cast doubt on the 
significance of these transitions. Most notably, continued and in some cases increasing human 
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rights abuses in countries such as Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe suggest that we have seen “a 
changing of the guards” rather than a genuine transformation of political systems. 
If we turn our attention to those countries that recorded negative trends, we see a very different 
pattern: deteriorating performance typically occurred in countries in which established leaders felt 
the need to adopt increasingly repressive strategies to retain control, and to subvert economic 
management to serve political ends as part of this effort. In some cases, this was in response to a 
strong challenge from the opposition (Kenya, Zambia), while in others it reflected an increase in 
popular unrest (Chad), and secessionist challenges to the legitimacy of the state itself (Cameroon). 
The only country to witness a significant decline in overall status in the absence of growing 
opposition was Tanzania, where the fall in the quality of governance under President John 
Magufuli appears to reflect more his personal leadership style and refusal to tolerate dissent than 
any actual increase in support for political rivals. 
Map: Sub-Saharan African regions 
 
While these changes were fundamentally driven by domestic politics, the BTI Africa Report 2020 
also documents important regional variations that merit further research and explanation. Southern 
and West Africa perform best on all three criteria – democracy, market economy and governance – 
with East and Central Africa lagging considerably behind. This reflects the historical process 
through which governments came to power, the kinds of states over which they govern, and the 
disposition and influence of regional organizations. In particular, East Africa features a number of 
countries ruled by former rebel armies (Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda), in which 
political control is underpinned by coercion and a long standing suspicion of opposition. This is also 
a challenge in some Central African states, but with the added complication of long running 
conflicts and political instability (Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo) 
that have undermined government performance on a number of dimensions.  
In this way, the BTI 2020 reveals a high degree of continuity in many African political systems, 
while also highlighting profound regional variations and the extent to which the past continues to 
shape the present. 
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Introduction 
For the last few years, the African political landscape has been dominated by significant political 
transitions in Ethiopia (2018), South Africa (2018), Sudan (2019) and Zimbabwe (2018), where 
leadership change promised to bring about not only a new man at the top, but also a new political 
and economic direction. Along with peaceful transfers of power in Liberia (2017), Sierra Leone 
(2018), and to a lesser extent the Democratic Republic of Congo (2019), the arrival of leaders who 
promised widespread reform also gave a much needed boost to pro-democracy activists across 
the continent. Ongoing demographic shifts were also cited as evidence that the time of Africa’s “old 
men” was over, and that a new era of accountability was on the way. Particularly important in this 
regard was evidence from countries such as Uganda that the interaction between evermore urban 
and youthful populations was generating greater support for a new kind of political leader, such as 
the outspoken musician turned legislator Bobi Wine.  
The optimism generated by these changes was consistently tempered, however, by a weary 
recognition that while a number of long-standing leaders left power, some of the underlying political 
and economic challenges facing their countries remained. In Zimbabwe, the use of repression to 
intimidate opposition parties and civil society groups led to accusations that despite all the rhetoric 
there was little difference between the new administration of President Emmerson Mnangagwa and 
the old Robert Mugabe regime. In South Africa, President Cyril Ramaphosa quickly found that 
there were powerful vested interests within the state and the ruling African National Congress 
(ANC) set on resisting his efforts to move against the corruption that had become commonplace 
under his predecessor, Jacob Zuma. In Ethiopia, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed hit the ground 
running, freeing political prisoners and promising a more inclusive government, but has struggled 
to bring rising ethnic tensions and localized violence under control. The picture is even more 
problematic in the DRC, where many believe that the wrong opposition candidate declared as the 
winner of the elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo in order to protect the interest of the 
outgoing president and his allies, who feared that the true winner would be too independent for 
them to be able to retain control.   
This complex reality demonstrates two important points. The first is that the fragility of democratic 
institutions and the personalization of power within the individual who occupies the executive 
means that leadership change is typically seen to be necessary for wider political and economic 
reform. This means that the removal of a “Big Man” is often greeted with great enthusiasm by 
citizens, civil society groups and outside observers alike, who view such transitions as an 
opportunity for far-reaching national renewal. The second is that in reality the scope of what 
individual leaders can – and want to – achieve is significantly constrained by the political and 
economic context within which they must operate. Although presidents can and often do wield vast 
power – especially in the continent’s less democratic states – they also face significant restraints, 
including: demands from supporters and allies to be rewarded for their loyalty; the need to protect 
the interests of the security forces in order to reduce the risk of a potential coup; and, powerful pre-
existing networks of civil servants and businessmen who exploit their privileged access to the state 
for personal gain, and can prove to be powerful opponents if their position is threatened. Taken 
together, these pressures often make it difficult to deliver justice for past human rights abuses, 
escape winner-takes-all political dynamics, and establish more accountable forms of politics. 
Indeed, the tendency for new leaders to be recruited from within the ruling elite itself – as Ahmed, 
Mnangagwa, and Ramaphosa all were – means that while they like to present themselves as a 
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break with the past, the continent’s “new brooms” are already implicated in the misdeeds of the 
past. 
It is also important to keep in mind that away from the high profile stories of leadership change lie 
many more stories of continuity. Despite the fall of some of the continents longest serving leaders 
– including Yahya Jammeh (2017), Omar al-Bashir (2019) and Robert Mugabe (2019) – Africa still 
contributes half of the world’s ten longest serving leaders. This includes Paul Biya of Cameroon 
(since 1982), Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea (since 1979), Yoweri 
Museveni of Uganda (since 1986), Idris Déby of Chad (since 1990) and Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea 
(since 1993). The length of tenure of these presidents is significant, because recent research has 
found that the longer a leader is in power, the more likely they are to try and rig elections.1  It is 
therefore unsurprising that the ongoing struggle for democracy across much of the continent is 
once again evident in BTI 2020. While Africa boasts two high quality democracies – Botswana and 
Mauritius – and a number of defective democracies, most countries are better thought of as 
electoral-authoritarian states; i.e. they hold elections but without all of the trappings of democracy, 
and so power rarely changes hands. In these countries, opposition parties often find themselves 
fighting two battles at the same time, one to win more votes in the next election, and the other to 
demand stronger and more independent democratic institutions so that if they secure the most 
votes they are actually allowed to win. 
Figure 1. Average Democracy scores for African regions, BTI 2006-2020* 
 
*To preserve the consistency of time-series, the following countries are not considered in this chart as they were added 
to the BTI country sample later than 2006: Equatorial Guinea, Republic of the Congo, Gabon (Central), Djibouti, South 
Sudan (Eastern), Eswatini, Lesotho (Southern), Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania (West). 
The extent of progress towards democratic consolidation varies tremendously across the continent, 
and in addition to the well-known differences between leading lights like Botswana and entrenched 
laggards like Rwanda there is also a profound regional variation that is less well recognized and 
                                                     
1 Nic Cheeseman and Brian Klaas, How to Rig an Election, Yale University Press, 2019. 
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understood. From relatively similar starting points in the early 1990s, there has been a sharp 
divergence between West and Southern Africa, which became and remain more open and 
democratic and Central and East Africa, which became and remain increasingly more closed and 
authoritarian (figure 1). This pattern is reflected in BTI Africa Report 2020, which explores and 
seeks to explain some of these variations, while recognizing that each region also contains a 
variety of very different political systems. 
The challenge of overcoming historical legacies has also been apparent in the past two years 
when it comes to economic transformation. One of the major economic developments of the recent 
period has been the identification of significant oil deposits in Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and, 
recently, Namibia, and major gas holdings in Mozambique and Tanzania. The value of these 
natural resources has the potential to increase government revenues dramatically, enabling ruling 
parties to develop better national infrastructure and to provide better services, but there are also 
many barriers to achieving this goal. Limited infrastructure increases the length of time and cost 
that it takes to bring oil and gas reserves to market, and often requires complex negotiations over 
the route that pipelines will take. At the same time, the potential for political instability – most 
notably in Mozambique and in the Turkana region of Kenya – has complicated the situation facing 
foreign investors, who are often required to fund large infrastructure programs. Partly as a result, 
developing natural resources in an effective and efficient way is often more challenging than it first 
appears. 
A second major development has been efforts to reduce barriers to trade by creating the African 
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in 2018. Covering 54 of the 55 member states of the 
African Union, AfCFTA is the largest free trade are in the world in terms of participating countries. 
The broader aim of AfCFTA is to increase trade between African countries in order to promote 
regional economic integration and sustainable economic growth. Initially, this will mean removing 
tariffs from 90% of goods, which the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa estimates will 
boost trade between African countries by 52% by 2022. As with efforts to promote regional 
economic integration, however, AfCFTA faces a number of challenges. The colonial legacy of a 
continent divided into numerous states – most of which have economies that are oriented to export 
valuable commodities to countries in Europe, North America, and increasingly China – creates 
powerful barriers to economic integration. Indeed, efforts to promote regional trade within the East 
African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) by reducing 
tariffs have often been undermined by distrust and the stipulation of large numbers of exemptions 
between supposed economic partners. It is therefore likely to be some time before AfCFTA 
realizes the increases in regional trade that many are hoping for. 
In both the political and economic sphere, then, efforts to reform and innovate remain constrained 
by existing ideas, institutions, and networks. 
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Political Transformation 
There was very little change (-0.04 on 1-10 scale) in the overall level of political transformation in 
sub-Saharan Africa between BTI 2018 and BTI 2020. The majority of African states remain in the 
“competitive authoritarian” category, in that they hold regular multiparty elections but do not fully 
respect citizen’s political rights and civil liberties. As in previous rounds of the BTI, however, there 
is considerable variation on the continent between those countries that can reasonably be 
considered to be consolidating (2 countries), defective (13) or highly defective (7) democracies and 
those that are in reality moderate (9) or hard-line (13) autocracies. 
The continuity in the overall quality of democracy in Africa is the result of two different trends. On 
the one hand, the vast majority of countries experienced gradual political change during this 
period, remaining in the same category as BTI 2018. On the other hand, where change occurred, 
the movement of countries towards and away from democracy tended to balance out, resulting in 
no overall change at the continental level. 
Tab. 1: Status of political transformation 
Consolidating 
democracies 
Defective 
democracies 
Highly defective 
democracies 
Moderate 
autocracies 
Hard-line 
autocracies 
Scores 10 to 8 Scores <8 to 6 Scores <6 Scores >4 Scores <4 
Mauritius 
Botswana 
Ghana 
Benin 
Namibia 
South Africa 
Senegal 
Gambia* 
Liberia 
Malawi 
Guinea-Bissau* 
Sierra Leone* 
Burkina Faso 
Niger 
Tanzania 
Guinea ▼ 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Mali 
Zambia ▼ 
Lesotho 
Nigeria 
Madagascar 
Uganda 
Togo 
Kenya ▼▼ 
Gabon* 
Angola 
Mozambique 
Zimbabwe ▲ 
Mauritania 
Ethiopia ▲ 
Rwanda 
Djibouti* 
Burundi 
Eswatini* 
Cameroon 
Central African R.● 
Congo, DR ● 
Congo, Rep. 
Chad 
Equatorial Guinea 
South Sudan ● 
Eritrea 
Somalia ● 
The table follows the BTI 2020 index scores. The countries are ranked according to their respective score in the 
Democracy Index. Arrows mark a change of category compared with the BTI 2018, dots mark failing states. 
Asterisks mark newly assessed countries. 
 
The most significant positive gains were all recorded in countries that experienced a change in 
leadership either just before or during the last round of the BTI, including Ethiopia (2018), Nigeria 
(2015), Sierra Leone (2018) and Zimbabwe (2018). This demonstrates the extent to which power 
remains personalized in many African states, and the capacity of individual leaders to reshape the 
political landscape. This has long been one of the most powerful tropes about African politics: the 
power of the “Big Man” and the limited constraints under which presidents and prime ministers 
operate. It is important not to exaggerate the power of individual leaders, however, or to overlook 
the fact that they inherit political and economic systems that had deep roots and are staffed by 
individuals who often have a vested interest in preserving the status quo. New leaders also face a 
range of other constraints such as limited resources, weak infrastructure and societal tensions that 
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limits what they can achieve in a short period of time. Indeed, the fact that the initial optimism in 
Ethiopia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe had begun to evaporate by the end of the current period 
demonstrates the extent new leaders struggle to free themselves from historical legacies. 
Countries on the up 
Ethiopia achieved the single biggest improvement in political transformation between 2017 and 
2019, moving up +0.98 on a 1-10 scale, as a result of the rise to power of Prime Minister Abiy 
Ahmed on 2 April 2018. In office, Abiy (as he is known in Ethiopia) rapidly instigated a number of 
reforms including releasing political prisoners, promising better quality elections, and appointing a 
gender balanced cabinet. However, these efforts have come under serious strain as a result of 
continued political instability in some parts of the country and a failed coup attempt against the 
regional government in the Amhara Region in June 2019. As a result, it looks like the same political 
turbulence that enabled Abiy to secure the premiership will also constrain his ability to transform 
the country.    
In Southern Africa, Zimbabwe was the only country to make significant progress where democracy 
was concerned, graduating from a hard-line to a moderate autocracy. Its improved score reflects 
the greater political openness surrounding the country’s 2018 elections, when the main opposition 
candidate, Nelson Chamisa, was allowed to campaign in rural areas in a way that his predecessor, 
Morgan Tsvangirai, had found impossible during the 2013 election campaign. However, hope that 
the country had experienced a major political turning point was subsequently undermined when the 
protests of opposition supporters against suspected electoral manipulation were violently 
repressed by the army, leading to at least six deaths.  
In West Africa, two countries became significantly more democratic, although by small amounts 
(0.10): Nigeria and Sierra Leone. In Nigeria, this resulted from improvements in state capacity and 
the rule of law under President Buhari, who has focused his efforts on turning the tide against the 
Boko Haram insurgency in the north, strengthening the central state, and gaining greater control 
over the corruption that had spiraled out of control under his predecessor. However, as with 
Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, this has not led to a straightforward gain for democracy, and the quality of 
governance actually fell, as discussed in greater detail below. Moreover, the 2019 elections 
provide to be highly controversial, with suggestions that the government deliberately depressed 
turnout in some opposition strongholds. At the same time, the security forces stand accused of 
committing human rights abuses in their effort to contain growing secessionist sentiment in the 
East of the country, which has experienced renewed calls for the creation of a separate Biafran 
nation.  
It might be expected that the change of government in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
would have had a similar effect to the changes seen in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe – after all, the 
victory of Felix Tshisekedi represented a peaceful transfer of power to an opposition leader whose 
father was known for contesting authoritarian rule. But while the BTI records an improvement in 
both democracy and governance scores, these are relatively small at 0.05 and 0.11, respectively. 
The reason is partly that Tshisekedi was sworn in right at the end of the period covered by this 
round of the BTI, and so changes that took place under his rule will only be fully captured in the 
next round. However, a more significant explanation for the limited movement in terms the 
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democracy is that few commentators believe that Tshisekedi actually won the election. Instead, it 
seems more likely that the election was won by Martin Fayulu, and that the outgoing president, 
Joseph Kabila, put pressure on the electoral commission to manipulate the election in Tshisekedi’s 
favor. 
The deal between Kabila and Tshisekedi appears to have been relatively straightforward. The 
president arranged for the candidate who had come a distant second to be announced the winner 
in return for assurances that his political and economic interests would be protected in the future. 
While Fayulu commanded considerable support and had strong links to some of Kabila’s most 
powerful rivals such as Moise Katumbi Chapwe, the former Governor of Katanga, Tshisekedi’s 
poor showing in the election threatened to leave him a political irrelevance. The two men therefore 
had much to gain by making a deal – and a great deal to lose by allowing Fayulu to emerge 
victorious.  
From the very start of his administration, then, President Tshisekedi has faced accusations that he 
is little more than a puppet doing the dirty work of his predecessor. The common assumption 
underpinning these critiques is that any deal between the two men will inevitably include a veto on 
political and economic reforms that would significantly alter the status quo. Only time will tell how 
tightly Kabila will be able to enforce the terms of the agreement, and whether Tshisekedi will come 
to resent having a back seat driver in his government and seek to assert his own authority. Any 
major rift between the two leaders could cause considerably political instability, with serious 
consequences for the region (see Outlook). 
Countries on the slide 
The positive gains achieved by the four countries discussed above were effectively cancelled out 
by democratic backsliding elsewhere on the continent, most notably in Kenya, which recorded the 
largest decline (-1.40). This was mostly due to the 2017 general elections and their aftermath. 
Following the Supreme Court’s nullification of President Kenyatta’s controversial victory in the 
general elections held on 8 August 2017, a “fresh” election was held on 26 October. This was 
ultimately boycotted by the main opposition candidate, Raila Odinga, who argued that there had 
been insufficient time to make the changes that would have been required to run a free and fair 
poll. Efforts by pockets of opposition supporters to disrupt the elections led to clashes with the 
security forces, setting the scene for a period of prolonged political confrontation. After Odinga and 
his allies rejected the legitimacy of Kenyatta’s victory and his supporters held a parallel swearing-in 
ceremony to inaugurate him as the “people’s president”, the heavy-handed response of the 
security forces resulted in over 100 deaths. Along with the verbal attacks on the judiciary by 
government leaders – including President Kenyatta himself – following the Supreme Court’s 
declaration that his victory on 8 August was “null and void”, this helps to explain why Kenya fell two 
categories, from defective democracy to moderate autocracy.  
The other significant decline occurred in Chad, which was already rated as a hard-line autocracy 
but which nonetheless saw its political transformation score fall 0.52. This reflected efforts by 
President Idriss Déby to further repress opposition groups, which led to renewed criticism from 
Amnesty International and other human rights organizations. One of the reasons for the repression 
was President Déby’s decision to force through a controversial new constitution that both extended 
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his powers and will allow him to remain in office for two presidential terms beyond elections 
scheduled for 2021. These changes suggest that, like a number of other leaders such as Ugandan 
President Yoweri Museveni, Déby intends to be a “life president”.  
Elsewhere, Zambia and Guinea were both relegated from the category of “defective democracies” 
to “highly defective democracies”, although in both cases this was due to a small decline in the 
actual BTI score. Nonetheless, this is a considerable cause for concern in both countries, 
especially in Zambia, whose trajectory under President Edgar Lungu has been troubling for some 
time. The previous BTI regional report for Africa captured the problematic fall out from Lungu’s 
victory in disputed elections in 2016, including the arrest of opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema 
on charges of treason in 2017. The last two years have witnessed further authoritarian abuses 
including sustained government efforts to intimidate and marginalize critical voices and a 
successful bid by Lungu to have the Constitutional Court – that he appoints – deem him an eligible 
candidate for the 2021 presidential election, when he will compete for a third term in office.2 In turn, 
this suggests that the country is heading for another controversial election and further rounds of 
opposition protest and government repression. 
Regional variations 
Africa features profound variations in the level of democracy between its different regions (Figure 
2). Reflecting the long-term trend identified in Figure 1, Southern (5.99) and West Africa (6.20) are 
considerably more democratic, on average, than Eastern (3.78) and Central Africa (3.48). This 
variation appears reflects a number of different historical and contemporary factors, but three in 
particular are worth highlighting here. First, over half of the states the BTI surveys in Central Africa 
– most notably the Central African Republic, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo – have 
either recently suffered a civil war or are experiencing an active insurgency, undermining the 
potential to build more durable and inclusive political institutions. While there are of course states 
experiencing conflict and insurgencies in West and Southern Africa – most obviously Nigeria and 
Mozambique – a much higher proportion of countries are peaceful and stable. 
Second, many of the states of Central Africa and around half the countries in Eastern Africa – 
including Burundi, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda, South Sudan and Uganda – are led by individuals 
who came to power as a result of the victory of a rebel army. While they have transitioned into 
civilian clothing and swapped titles such as “general” for “president”, their governance styles have 
often reflected military rather than civilian priorities, such as an emphasis on discipline, hierarchy 
and the use of force to settle disputes. Partly as a result, they are less likely to recognize the value 
of dissent and tend to view opposition as inherently suspicious, relying heavily on coercive 
institutions to sustain their rule.  
It is true, of course, that a number of former military leaders have also governed West African 
states – including Ghana, Nigeria and Togo – but the proportion has been lower and some states, 
such as Senegal, have a long tradition of plural politics and civilian leadership. In a similar vein, 
                                                     
2 This was highly controversial, as Lungu is currently in his second presidential term and the country has a two-term limit. 
He argued that as his first one was short – he completed the term of President Michael Sata, who died in office in 2014 – 
that he should be allowed a third term. This was permitted under a new constitutional provision, but as the provision came 
in after Lungu took power, many critics argued that the previous constitutional arrangement should have held, in which 
case he would have had to step down in 2021. 
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while a number of former armed groups or “liberation” forces are in power in Southern Africa – 
including in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe – some of these 
developed out of broad based movements that placed a high value on political participation and 
civil liberties. Most obviously, the Freedom Charter adopted by the African National Congress in 
1955 committed South Africa’s future ruling party to promoting human rights and limiting the 
powers of the president and the police. Partly as a result, the impact of former military or rebel 
leaders taking power has been less deleterious – though still significant – to democracy in 
Southern and West Africa. 
Figure 2. Quality of democracy in Africa, by region 
 
Finally, regional politics has an important role to play in the political trajectory of African states. In 
West and to a lesser extent Southern Africa, the regional hegemon has used its influence to 
promote democratic change in its neighbors. For example, while Nigeria’s own democratic status is 
far from assured, its leadership, along with that of democratic states such as Senegal, has been 
pivotal to the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to promote 
democracy in the region. Most notably, ECOWAS played a critical role in forcing President Yahya 
Jammeh from power in 2017, after he had begun to dispute the victory of opposition leader Adama 
Barrow. Similarly, while the South African government has regularly been criticized for failing to do 
more to encourage President Robert Mugabe to reform during his time in power in Zimbabwe, it 
intervened militarily in Lesotho in 1998 in a bid to prevent what the then President Nelson Mandela 
described as a “virtual coup”. There have been no comparable efforts by regional organizations to 
intervene to promote democracy in Eastern and Central Africa. 
Although no region saw large shifts in the quality of democracy between BTI 2018 and BTI 2020 
(Figure 3), the evidence suggests that the trends identified above are likely to continue. While the 
overall quality of democracy grew by a very small amount in Southern Africa, it fell by an equally 
small amount in Central and West Africa. The only region registering larger declines in the quality 
of democracy was Central Africa (-0.17). This was in large part driven by the repressive response 
of the government of Cameroon (-0.37) to the “Anglophone crisis”, which came about as a result of 
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growing frustration of English-speaking Cameroonians at their marginalization by the 
predominantly French-speaking regime. According to Human Rights Watch, government security 
forces committed a number of human rights abuses in their effort to put down the growing 
secessionist movement, including extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests and torture.  
Figure 3. Democracy trend in Africa, BTI 2018-2020, by region  
 
Events in Senegal (-0.15) played into the minor negative trend in West Africa, as the arrest of two 
of the main rivals of the president ahead of elections in 2019 paved the way for a landslide victory 
for President Macky Sall. Although the government claimed that the former Mayor of Dakar, Khalifa 
Sall, and the son of ex-president Abdoulaye Wade, Karim Wade, were prosecuted as part of 
ongoing anti-corruption efforts, Amnesty International protested that they had both suffered “unfair 
trails”. It remains to be seen whether these trends – and growing concerns about Benin, discussed 
below – represent the start of longer process of democratic backsliding. 
-0.17
-0.07
0.06
-0.07
-0.04
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
Central Eastern Southern West Sub-Saharan Africa
A Changing of the Guards or A Change of Systems? — BTI 2020 Report Sub-Saharan Africa | Page 15 
 
Economic Transformation 
There was no meaningful change (-0,04) in the status of economic transformation at the 
continental level between BTI 2018 and BTI 2020. Indeed, of all three of the main BTI categories, 
economic transformation was the one that saw the least recategorization of countries, with only 
three countries reclassified upwards (Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe) and 
only one reclassified downwards (Mauritius). Moreover, in two of these cases – Central African 
Republic (+0.04) and Mauritius (-0.07) – the magnitude of the change was extremely small and the 
reclassification occurred because the country was already very close to the threshold. 
Tab. 2: Status of economic transformation 
highly advanced advanced limited highly limited rudimentary 
Scores 10 to 8 Scores <8 to 7 Scores <7 to 5 Scores <5 to 3 Scores <3 
 Mauritius ▼ 
Botswana 
South Africa 
Uganda 
Rwanda 
Ghana 
Kenya 
Namibia 
Côte d'Ivoire ▲ 
Senegal 
Benin 
Gabon* 
Tanzania 
Gambia* 
Guinea 
Togo 
Madagascar 
Cameroon 
Lesotho 
Zambia 
Djibouti* 
Burkina Faso 
Malawi 
Guinea-Bissau* 
Liberia 
Mali 
Sierra Leone* 
Mauritania 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Angola 
Ethiopia 
Congo, Rep. 
Eswatini* 
Chad 
Burundi 
Equatorial Guinea 
Central African R. ▲ 
Zimbabwe ▲ 
Congo, DR 
South Sudan 
Eritrea 
Somalia 
The table follows the BTI 2020 index scores. The countries are ranked according to their respective score in the 
Market Economy Index. Arrows mark a change of category compared with the BTI 2018. Asterisks mark newly 
assessed countries. 
 
In contrast to political transformation, where African states are spread fairly evenly over a number 
of categories, and governance, where they cluster towards the middle of the spectrum, when it 
comes to economic transformation the vast majority of states – 28 out of 44 – are located in the 
“highly limited” category, the second worst in the BTI scale. 
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This reflects the high number of different challenges that governments face including colonial 
legacies such as landlocked states and unbalanced economies, limited infrastructure, pressure to 
reward supporters rather than invest in public goods, and the difficulty of prioritizing long-term 
sustainability over short-term consumption in countries in which a significant proportion of citizens 
continue to live below or near the poverty line.  
Between BTI 2018 and 2020, the biggest gains came in Cote d’Ivoire (+0.21), Nigeria (+0.25), and 
Zimbabwe (+0.18), while the biggest losses occurred in Burundi (-0.86) and Liberia (-0.21). With 
the exception of Burundi, these are all relatively modest changes, which again highlights the extent 
of continuity in this area. 
Countries on the up 
The biggest improvement was achieved in Nigeria (+0.25). This had less to do with an 
improvement in the overall quality of governance – which actually declined, as discussed below – 
and more to do with the impact of rising oil prices and the actions of the Central Bank to stabilize 
the currency. While the rate of economic growth remains modest at just 1.9% in 2018, and the 
country remains overly dependent on the proceeds of oil and gas exports, an improvement in the 
crude oil prices on world markets from their long-time low in mid-2016 of $40 per barrel to close to 
$70 per barrel at the end of 2018 gradually enabled Nigeria to pull out of its worst recession in 30 
years.  
Although macroeconomic conditions continued to be unstable, and the government struggled to 
identify and implement strategies to boost growth and reduce poverty, the overall economic 
position stopped deteriorating and foreign reserves slightly increased to around $43 billion towards 
the end of 2018. At the same time, well-timed injections of foreign exchange by the Central Bank 
stabilized the exchange rate on the parallel market at Naira 360 to the dollar – an impressive 
achievement given the numerous challenges that the country faces. Small improvements were also 
achieved in other areas, including respect for property rights.  
Cote d’Ivoire also recorded a significant improvement (+0.21) as it continues its recovery from the 
damaging impact of prolonged civil conflict and political instability. In line with a gradual 
improvement since 2014, the period 2018-2020 saw further gains. Although economic growth fell 
from 10.1% in 2012 to 7.7% in 2017 and 7.4% in 2018, continued inflows of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) have enabled the government to reduce unemployment. At the same time, 
successive years of high growth rates have led to the expansion of the tax base to 18.2% of gross 
domestic income, which in turn has enabled the government to spend more on public services.  
Partly as a result, while the country continues to suffer from a significant gender gap on most 
indicators – with women 14% less likely to be literate than men – the enrollment gap (the ratio of 
female to male enrollment in primary school) has improved to 0.9% at the primary level and 0.7% 
at the secondary level. There has also been an improvement in women’s participation in the 
workforce, which increased from 37.3% in 2007 to 31.1% in 2019. Moreover, while President 
Alassane Dramane Ouattara has been accused of democratic backsliding, especially after the 
government disrupted opposition rallies in the lead up to the 2015 general elections, the victory of 
a leader from the north of the country has led to a reversal in the historical marginalization of 
communities from this part of the country, leading to greater equality of opportunity. 
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Finally, Zimbabwe’s economic transformation was upgraded from “rudimentary” to “highly limited” 
as result of the reforms introduced and promised by President Mnangagwa, which led to a modest 
improvement of +0.18. In addition to pledging to respect private property – including offering 
compensation to farmers whose property had been seized during the land invasion era – 
Mnangagwa appointed the widely respected Mthuli Ncube, a former Vice President of the African 
Development Bank, as Finance Minister. This was initially accompanied by a reversal of President 
Mugabe’s notorious hostility towards Western states, as the new government sought to adopt a 
more constructive tone towards the United States and the United Kingdom, hinting that the country 
might rejoin the Commonwealth and promising to open the country up to foreign investors. 
Mnangagwa also travelled to Davos for the World Economic Forum to give a speech in which he 
promised, “economics and trade cooperation would be my priority”. However, critics quickly pointed 
out that behind the bold words the government had failed to make significant changes in key areas, 
in part because powerful groups – including established ZANU-PF figures and the military leaders 
who played a central role in forcing Mugabe from power – have a vested interest in preventing the 
reform of the sectors of the economy in which they operate. Along with rampant inflation, which hit 
an annual rate of 300% in August 2019, the highest rate in the world according to the International 
Monetary Fund, the lack of genuine transformation quickly began to undermine the confidence of 
both the public and foreign investors in the capacity and willingness of the Mnangagwa 
administration to deliver on its promises. 
Countries on the slide 
The recent experience of Cote d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe demonstrates the significance of political 
change to economic performance. While an end to civil conflict provided the foundation for Cote 
d’Ivoire’s economic transformation, new political leadership was central to the (short lived) return of 
economic optimism in Zimbabwe. In a similar vein, political turmoil has often led to a rapid 
deterioration in economic performance. The best illustration of this relationship in recent years is 
the case of Burundi, where political instability and a descent into authoritarian rule have led to a fall 
of -0.86 in the country’s rating for economic transformation. 
This decline can be traced back to the onset of economic crisis in 2015. This period has seen 
rising unemployment and declining purchasing power, which was triggered by the political crisis 
that began when President Pierre Nkurunziza intimidated the Constitutional Court into allowing him 
to stand for a third term in office. This power grab led to opposition protests, a failed coup attempt, 
and rising repression. Against an increasingly authoritarian backdrop, and the absence of effective 
engagement with international donors and investors, Burundi has experienced rising debt – from 
USD $30.2 million in 2014 to USD $36 million in 2017 – at the same time as a gradual decline in 
the quality of life as measured by the Human Development Index. 
The government’s own actions in the economic sphere have contributed significantly to the 
worsening situation. The imposition of new taxes to finance elections has increased the burden on 
citizens and businesses that were already struggling, at a time when inflation has increased from 
just 4.4% in 2014 to 16.1% in 2017. Meanwhile, a shortage of credit and funds has led to growing 
government interference in the banking sector. According to the International Crisis Group, the 
Finance Minister required a number of banks – including the Burundi Commercial Bank, the 
Burundi Bank of Commerce and Investment, the Bujumbura Credit Bank, the National Bank of 
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Economic Development, and the Urban Habitat Fund – to pay their end-of-year dividends to the 
state rather than to their staff, creating a precedent that is likely to worry potential investors.  
The other significant decline in economic management came in Liberia, which experienced a fall of 
-0.21 between BTI 2018 and 2020. This was largely due to the change of government in 2017, 
when George Weah won the presidency at the third time of asking. While the peaceful transfer of 
power spoke to the country’s growing democratic maturity, it did not lead to an improvement in 
government policy. There were two aspects to this. First, the government of President Ellen 
Johnson Sirleaf lost its focus on key economic targets towards the end of her second term, when 
the attentions of the administration shifted to the succession struggle to replace her and the need 
to win the forthcoming election.  
Second, the new Weah government failed to reverse this decline due to the composition of his 
coalition and the pressures that the new president was placed under to reward those who had 
financially backed his campaign – and had supported him in his previous unsuccessful endeavors. 
In particular, concerns over rising corruption and questionable economic deals involving members 
of his entourage – which contributed to a decline in the quality of governance that is described in 
greater detail below – suggest that long-term economic planning is being sacrificed on the altar of 
short-term political expediency. Unless Weah is able to withstand the pressure to allow his 
supporters privileged access to economic opportunities, a further decline is likely to be recorded in 
the next BTI report. 
Regional variations 
At the regional level, the picture is remarkably similar to that for democracy: Southern Africa leads 
the way followed by West Africa, with East and Central Africa lagging behind (figure 4). However, it 
is worth noting that the gap between the regions is smaller when it comes to economic 
management, and there are some signs that it is may shrink further due to a positive trend in 
Central Africa and a negative trend in Southern Africa (figure 5).  
In Southern Africa, economic difficulties have been driven by a number of factors including the 
poor performance of regional hegemons, growing budget deficits, and a rising debt burden. Most 
notably, the South African economy, which is important for the Southern African region as both a 
key source of investment and an export market, has struggled, growing at just 1.3% per capita in 
2017, followed by a contraction of 0.7% in 2018. Partly as a result of South Africa’s economic 
slowdown, Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia all suffered negative economic growth in either 2017 or 
2018. Elsewhere in Southern Africa, rising oil prices eased the challenges facing the Angolan 
government, but did not rebound sufficiently to move the region’s second largest economy out of 
recession. Having enjoyed growth of 6.5% between 2008 and 2010 when prices were higher, the 
petro-state saw negative growth in both 2017 and 2018. According to the African Development 
Bank, this contributed to a slowdown in regional growth from a recent high of 3.9% in 2011-2013 to 
1.6% in 2017 and just 1.2% in 2018. In turn, this has negatively impacted on scores for economic 
performance and socioeconomic development. 
West and Central Africa have fared somewhat better – the only two regions to record a positive 
trend between BTI 2018 and 2020, albeit one of negligible magnitude. In Central Africa, this 
reflected a more positive economic environment due to the rising value of key exports, most 
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notably oil. Partly as a result, regional GDP growth accelerated to 2.2% in 2018, from 1.1% in 
2017. Although this remained below the African average, it enabled governments to adopt 
marginally more ambitious economic policies, with all countries in the region experiencing no 
change or a positive trend in economic management, with the exception of the Republic of Congo. 
Serious challenges remain, however, including the fact that Central Africa is one of the least 
economically integrated regions in sub-Saharan Africa, and the potential for conflict and instability 
to undermine economic recovery. 
Figure 4. Economic transformation in Africa, by region 
 
Figure 5. Economic transformation trend in Africa, BTI 2018-2020, by region 
 
The recovery in oil prices also eased the economic situation in West Africa, where GDP growth 
increased from 2.7% in 2017 to 3.3% in 2018. Although this remained lower than in East Africa, a 
number of countries performed considerably better, with nine countries enjoying growth of at least 
5%. As in Southern Africa, overall economic trends are largely driven by the state of the economy 
in the regional hegemon – in this case Nigeria, which contributes two-thirds of West African GDP. 
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Although rising oil prices led to the Nigerian economy moving out of recession, with growth 
recovering from 0.8% in 2017 to 1.9% in 2018, the African Development Bank argues that 
relatively low levels of oil production – in part due to the vandalism of oil installations in the Niger 
Delta – has limited economic expansion. Similarly, while the regional economic outlook has been 
strengthened by the end of the Ebola crisis, which undermined tourism and disrupted business 
networks in countries such Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone from 2014 onwards, the legacy of the 
epidemic continues to be felt and is one reason that economic growth remains modest – especially 
in the latter two countries.   
The picture in East Africa is rather more mixed. The negative trend highlighted in figure 5 reflects 
the fact that some governments are not making the most of the economic opportunities available to 
their countries, most notably in Burundi and Uganda. Elsewhere, however, the overall economic 
situation has been relatively positive as a result of a robust period of economic growth, during 
which the largest economies – Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania – have consistently grown by more 
than 5% year on year. At the same time, only South Sudan has suffered negative economic growth 
as a result of the disruption caused by civil war. Consequently, according to the African 
Development Bank, Eastern Africa’s GDP held steady from 2016 onwards at just under 6%. The 
challenges facing the region therefore came from other sources, including a deteriorating fiscal 
balance. In Burundi, the deficit has grown from -6.5% of GDP in 2017 to -8.8% in 2018. In Burundi, 
a -6.5% deficit increased further to -8.8%. In Djibouti, a high deficit of 15.3% in 2017 was followed 
by one of 15.5% in 2018. Eritrea has also experienced consistent double digit deficits over the last 
few years. Consequently, the overall fiscal deficit in the region increased to 3.8% of GDP in 2017 
and then again to 4.1% in 2018. Thus, while growth has been relatively positive, the failure of many 
countries to deliver balanced budgets negatively impacted on the region’s scores for monetary 
stability and economic performance. 
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Governance 
There was also very little change in the overall quality of governance (+0,01) between BTI 2018 
and BTI 2020. As in the previous round of the BTI, African countries are distributed as in a bell 
curve graph – in other words, the vast majority find themselves right in the middle of the spectrum 
(moderate governance) with relatively few receiving the best (very good) or worst (failed) scores. In 
line with the other categories discussed above, this continuity reflects the relative stability of a 
number of countries and the fact that what change has occurred at the country level has tended to 
balance out across the continent. For example, during the last round of the BTI, four countries 
were reclassified downwards (Liberia, Niger, Nigeria and the Republic of Congo) while three were 
reclassified upwards (Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe).  
Tab. 4: Quality of governance 
very good good moderate weak failed 
Scores 10 to 7 Scores <7 to 6 Scores <6 to 4 Scores <4 to 3 Scores <3 
Botswana Mauritius 
Senegal 
Ghana 
South Africa 
Benin 
Gambia* 
Guinea 
Malawi 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Madagascar 
Liberia ▼ 
Niger ▼ 
Burkina Faso 
Rwanda 
Mali 
Namibia 
Djibouti* 
Uganda 
Ethiopia ▲ 
Togo 
Sierra Leone* 
Gabon* 
Kenya 
Guinea-Bissau* 
Zambia 
Tanzania 
Mozambique ▲ 
Angola 
Central African R. 
Nigeria ▼ 
Mauritania 
Cameroon 
Lesotho 
Equatorial Guinea 
Burundi 
Zimbabwe ▲ 
Eswatini* 
Congo, Rep. ▼ 
Congo, DR 
Chad 
Somalia 
South Sudan 
Eritrea 
The table follows the BTI 2020 index scores. The countries are ranked according to their score in the Governance 
Index. Arrows mark a change of category compared with the BTI 2018. Asterisks mark newly assessed countries. 
 
As one would expect, there is a correlation between significant shifts in democracy and in 
governance, and so some of the countries that experienced the largest increases in political 
transformation also made progress in this category (Ethiopia and Zimbabwe). However, a number 
of countries that saw no significant improvements in the overall quality of democracy nonetheless 
realized an improvement in their governance rating, most notably Angola and Benin. Conversely, a 
number of countries rated as “defective democracies” – the second highest category – only have 
moderate governance, including Burkina Faso, Liberia, Namibia, Niger, Guinea Bissau, Sierra 
Leone, and Tanzania. This serves as an important reminder that while high quality democracy may 
promote better governance over time, this cannot be taken for granted. Governments at all levels 
of political transformation can improve their ability to set and implement policy, and tackle 
corruption. 
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Countries on the up 
In most of the countries experiencing an improvement in governance, new leaders introduced 
reforms that improved their country’s performance by a considerable – although rarely 
transformative – degree.  
The biggest gain between 2018 and 2020 occurred in Ethiopia, where Prime Minister Abiy sought 
to strike a different note to his predecessors, promising to open up the country’s previously tightly 
guarded banks and finance sector to investors. He also surprised many commentators – and many 
Ethiopians – by moving to arrest a number of high-ranking military officers who stood accused of 
corruption and human rights abuses. At the same time, Abiy’s willingness to free political detainees 
including opposition leader Andargachew Tsege, to accept the ruling of a 2002 border commission 
and give disputed territory to Eritrea, and subsequently to bring the conflict with Eritrea to a close, 
demonstrated a newfound willingness to build consensus both domestically and internationally. 
While the pace of change slowed towards the end of his first year in power, Abiy’s actions led to an 
improvement in Ethiopia’s quality of governance score from 3.65 to 4.96, a sizeable increase of 
1.31 – though as already noted, popular confidence in his reform credentials subsequently 
declined significantly. 
Zimbabwe also experienced a significant improvement in governance under a new leader (+0.82), 
with a greater focus on rationalizing economic management, stabilizing the currency situation, and 
strengthening relationships with important international actors such as the International Monetary 
Fund – whose support is likely to be critical to long-term economic recovery. However, as with 
economic performance, the government does not appear to be able to deliver on its early 
promises. In the face of mounting opposition protests against the political situation and civil society 
protests against the economic situation and the abuse of human rights, the ZANU-PF government 
has increasingly sought to scapegoat its domestic rivals and international critics rather than 
actually tackling the structural barriers to economic growth. For example, by early 2019 the 
Mnangagwa government had already moved away from the initial rhetoric of the reform agenda 
and began accusing Western governments of seeking to undermine the country’s economy and 
orchestrate “regime change”, effectively reverting to a Mugabe-era strategy. Some of these shifts 
came too late to be included in BTI 2020, and therefore did not undermine the governance score. 
They are important to report here, however, because they suggest that these gains are highly 
unlikely to be sustained into the next round of the BTI. 
Leadership change also facilitated an improvement in governance in Angola, despite little change 
in the overall quality of democracy. The replacement of José Eduardo dos Santos as president by 
João Lourenço in 2017 did not initially lead to great optimism, as Lourenço was both a former army 
general and a handpicked loyalist. However, within weeks of his inauguration, Lourenço used the 
vast powers given to under the 2010 constitution to denounce corruption and remove some of dos 
Santos’ allies from their positions. In turn, this has led to stronger relations with international 
financial institutions and an improvement in the country’s governance rating from 3.60 to 4.23, an 
increase of 0.63. 
Mozambique followed a similar pathway, in that the changes described here followed the 
accession of Filipe Jacinto Nyusi to the presidency in 2015. Although the country experienced a 
relatively small change overall (0.16), an improvement in five of the 14 governance indicators was 
sufficient for it to be reclassified as having moderate rather than weak governance. Key changes 
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included evidence of greater commitment to move against corruption at all levels of the political 
system through the Gabinete Central de Combate à Corrupção (GCCC) since the end of 2018. 
There has also been valuable progress in terms of the ability of civil society groups to participate in 
economic and political decisions, and greater efforts to build consensus following a period of 
growing tensions between the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) government and the 
Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) opposition, which had threatened to return the 
country to civil war.  
Leadership change also led to an improvement in governance in Benin (+0.22), where President 
Thomas Boni Yayi stood down in 2016 having completed the constitutional limit of two terms in 
power, and was replaced by Patrice Talon. This is largely because Talon’s drive to use the 
experience that he had accumulated as a successful businessman to reform key sectors of the 
economy such as agriculture suggests that the new government has greater capacity to prioritize 
and implement its policy agenda. However, as with so many of the other changes reported here, 
the picture in Benin is somewhat mixed. In the governance sphere, critics suspect that allies and 
associates of President Talon – and possibly the president himself – has been able to benefit 
disproportionately from the privatization programme that he has pursued, while petty corruption 
and bureaucratic blockages continue to slow the pace of reform. At the same time, the 
parliamentary elections of April 2019, in which opposition parties were prevented from standing as 
a result of procedural obstacles that were put in their way, undermined President Talon’s claims to 
be committed to deepening democracy and transparency.  
These contradictory trends mean that while Benin recorded an improvement in its governance, it 
recorded a decline in the overall quality of democracy (-0.10). This suggests that there is a real risk 
that Talon’s reforms will ultimately be undermined by a combination of corruption and political 
controversy. 
Countries on the slide 
Three West African states (Liberia, Niger, and Nigeria) and one Central African state (Republic of 
Congo) were reclassified downwards between BTI 2018 and BTI 2020. In the case of the Republic 
of Congo, this resulted from a very small decline of -0.07, which was sufficient to move the country 
below the threshold for being considered “weak”, but should not be taken to imply a dramatic 
change in the quality of governance. The changes in West Africa have been more significant.  
In Liberia, the deterioration in economic performance described in the previous section was 
underpinned by a fall in the quality of governance to -0.49. There were three main reasons for this 
decline. First, the government’s determination to improve and implement key policies such as anti-
corruption measures fell during the second term of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and this continued into 
the Weah administration. Despite only having been in power for two years, key integrity institutions 
have been weakened and there have already been a number of accusations that figures close to 
the president are personally benefitting from his policies. Second, and relatedly, the Weah 
government has demonstrated a lack of experience and internal political coherence. Partly as a 
result, his cabinet failed to hit the ground running, taking over a year to develop its five-year 
development plan, the “Pro-poor Agenda for Prosperity and Development” (PAPD), leading to 
lower scores for policy coordination.  
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Finally, the scramble for positions the followed Weah’s election resulted in the promotion of many 
of his allies to prominent positions, even in some cases in which they had dubious qualifications, 
weakening the capacity and competence of the state. At the same time, the growing role played by 
Weah’s financial backers crowded out civil society groups in some areas, which in turn undermined 
on efforts to use a multi-stakeholder governance model to ensure transparency and accountability 
in the management of the agriculture, forestry, oil and mining. In turn, the weakening of 
transparency and integrity mechanisms is likely to facilitate greater economic and political abuses 
in future. 
Niger also experienced a disappointing decline in the quality of governance – the largest single 
drop of any country in the BTI’s Africa sample (-0.61). As in Liberia during Johnson Sirleaf’s 
second term, this reflected the declining commitment of the sitting government to key reforms 
during its second stint in office. During the first term of President Mahamadou Issoufou (2011-
2016), his administration prioritized poverty reduction strategies, nutrition programs, and the 
greater integration of the North of the country. However, the government’s focus began to drift 
thereafter, while a growing emphasis on the importance of winning the war against Boko Haram 
and other insurgencies has meant that the government has become increasingly narrow and short-
term in its approach. Although the president did outline a new plan for economic and social 
development (2017-2021), this tended to place a greater emphasis on security than sustainable 
growth and poverty reduction. One reason for the securitization of development is that there is 
considerably more international financial assistance available to deal with the threat of radical 
insurgencies than there is to build effective public services. For example, while five Sahalian states 
formed the Group of Five (G5) for the Sahel in order to strengthen regional cooperation in efforts to 
promote security and development, international actors such as France and the United States have 
tended to focus – and direct funding towards – security projects such as the creation of a Joint 
Force (Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel or FC-G5). 
The malaise that this has generated is well illustrated by the fact that in the period under review 
President Issoufou failed to outline any programs that really seek to alleviate the structural 
constraints that combine to keep his country poor and insecure. Most notably, the government 
continues to be a long way from achieving any of the Millennium Development Goals, and while it 
is rhetorically committed to the Sustainable Development Goals it has yet to outline any concrete 
plans for how they can be met. This is unfortunate, as the response of donors to the “migrant 
crisis” – and in particular the efforts of European governments to stem the flow of people from 
countries such as Niger by supporting projects that are designed to boost “community resilience” – 
has made new resources available.  To date, however, the government has not played a prominent 
role in coordinating these efforts or ensuring that they contribute to a coherent and integrated 
approach to development. Instead, there is some evidence that the expansion of donor activity in 
this area has encouraged the government to pull back, becoming less responsive to the needs of 
its own people. 
A number of other states were not recategorized downwards but nonetheless saw a significant 
deterioration in the quality of governance, including Tanzania and Zambia. In both cases, this 
reflected the uncompromising strategy adopted by an intransigent president, although the context 
in which this occurred was very different in each country. As discussed above, President Lungu 
has been struggling to assert his legitimacy and authority in Zambia since he became the 
presidential candidate of the Patriotic Front ruling party in controversial circumstances in 
November 2014. Anticipating an uphill battle to retain power in 2021 – given how close previous 
A Changing of the Guards or A Change of Systems? — BTI 2020 Report Sub-Saharan Africa | Page 25 
 
elections have been and the country’s economic difficulties – Lungu has set about retaining control 
through a combination of marginalizing opposition, eroding the independence of key governance 
institutions, and unsustainable public spending. In turn, the failure to agree a much needed $1.2 
billion recovery package with the International Monetary Fund has undermined the prospects of 
effectively managing the country’s growing debt burden. As a result of declining scores for 
international cooperation and consensus-building, Zambia’s overall governance rating fell from 
5.06 to 4.48, a fall of 0.58.  
The trend in Tanzania has been similar, although the reasons for it have been very different. 
President John Magufuli was elected in 2015 as the leader of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the 
ruling party since independence. He was initially lauded for his direct and down-to-earth style, 
sweeping the streets and promising to wide out corruption. But as time has gone on, concerns 
have grown about the way in which the new president’s populist stylings and determination to force 
through change have undermined consensus-building. While opposition parties have been 
intimidated – with public rallies banned – and critical journalists have been arrested, Magufuli’s 
aggressive stance towards international donors and investors has led to a significant drop in 
Foreign Direct Investment. meanwhile, avoiding many of the international meetings attended by his 
predecessors – ostensibly on the basis he wanted to cut down on government spending – has also 
led some critics to describe his foreign policy as isolationist. Taken together, these developments 
have hurt the country’s score on both resource efficiency and consensus-building, resulting in an 
overall decline in quality of governance from 5.07 to 4.47, a decline of 0.60. 
Regional variations 
The regional pattern when it comes to the quality of governance closely resembles that for 
democracy: Southern and West Africa are rated as the best performing regions, with Eastern and 
Central Africa lagging some way behind (figure 6). There are some important differences, however. 
The gap between Southern/West Africa and Eastern/Central Africa is also considerably smaller 
when it comes to governance than democracy. This suggests that while democracy tends to 
promote accountable and responsive government and so facilitates better governance, some 
democracies fail to deliver while a number of authoritarian regimes provide reasonable levels of 
governance despite the absence of effective checks and balances on the abuse of power. 
As with the quality of democracy, the trend over the last two rounds of the BTI has been for the 
quality of governance to improve in Southern Africa but deteriorate slightly in West Africa (figure 7). 
In addition to the deterioration already noted in Liberia and Niger, this was driven by events in 
Nigeria where a small improvement in the quality of democracy went hand in hand with a 
significant decline in the quality of governance (-0.55). This reflects the difficulty that President 
Buhari’s government has had in performing key tasks – such as the appointment of the cabinet and 
setting of economic policy – quickly and efficiently. Despite efforts to curb corruption and stabilize 
the economy, the strategic priorities set by the government have regularly shifted as a result of 
short-term pressures, most notably the security challenges posed by Boko Haram in the north and 
growing secessionist sentiment in the south-east. The campaign to re-elect the president in the 
2019 general elections also deflected the government’s attention from the country’s pressing socio-
economic challenges.  
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Figure 6. Quality of governance in Africa, by region 
 
Figure 7. Governance trend in Africa, BTI 2018-2020, by region 
 
Along with the challenge of ensuring that national policy priorities are implemented at both the 
federal and state level, these factors led to a deterioration in the country’s scores for policy 
implementation and efficient use of its natural resources. Meanwhile the president’s heavy handed 
approach to dealing with the re-emergence of support for an independent Biafran state – as 
discussed above – resulted in a more critical evaluation of its conflict management strategy. Taken 
together, these developments reveal a government that lacks the flexibility and quick feet needed 
to manage simultaneous economic and security challenges.  
It is too early to say whether the recent trend in West Africa is indicative of a more fundamental 
change of direction that will lead to a greater convergence between the different regions. It is 
important to note, however, that none of the changes between BTI 2018 and 2020 are particularly 
large, which suggests that regional differences in the quality of governance will not be eroded in 
the near future. 
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Outlook 
The main variations and trends identified in this report – such as the greater progress towards 
democratic consolidation and good governance in West and Southern Africa as compared to East 
and Central Africa – are likely to continue in the near future. While a number of countries remain 
vulnerable to rapid political change, most notably those in which weak states face continued 
insurgencies and the threat of civil conflict – including the Central African Republic, Mali, and Niger 
– in general change is likely to be gradual and to continue to be shaped by the key drivers 
discussed in this report.  
West and Southern African states will benefit from being in comparatively favorable 
neighborhoods, complete with regional organization that have demonstrated a willingness to 
intervene to prevent authoritarian abuses – at least in some cases. In turn, this will encourage 
further democratization, or at the very least discourage democratic reversals. By contrast, East and 
Central African states operate in much less favorable neighborhoods that facilitate autocratization. 
While the relatively stable authoritarian states of East Africa have no interest in fostering 
democracy, the conflict-prone states of Central Africa pose political and economic risks to one 
another. Domestic politics will of course complicate this picture, and has consistently been shown 
to be more significant than international factors where long-term democratization is concerned, but 
is unlikely to do so in a way that reverses the trends of the last decade.  
In East Africa, the domestic political outlook suggests there will be further threats to political rights 
and civil liberties. Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan are likely to remain either too closed or too 
unstable for significant democratic gains to be realized. At the same time, authoritarian leaders in 
Burundi, Djibouti, Rwanda and Uganda have established themselves as presidents for life and can 
be expected to respond to any challenge to their authority with repression, resulting in either 
continuity or, where a stronger opposition challenges emerges – as appears to be happening in 
Uganda – a further deterioration in political transformation. At present, Tanzania is considerably 
more politically competitive than this group of states, but President Magufuli has already 
established a track record of being unwilling to accept criticism and intimidating opposition parties 
and civil society groups. It therefore seems likely that the build-up to the 2022 elections will see 
further infringements on civil liberties, undermining consensus and increasing the potential for high 
profile criticism from the international community. 
There is also a significant risk of democratic backsliding elsewhere in East Africa. While Kenya is 
currently politically stable as a result of the “handshake” between President Uhuru Kenyatta and 
long-time opposition leader Raila Odinga – which ended the political impasse following the 2017 
elections crisis – political tensions will rise ahead of the 2022 elections. In particular, competition to 
succeed Kenyatta when he stands down having served two terms in office threatens to split the 
government in two. If Deputy President William Ruto is not selected as the ruling party’s 
presidential candidate, something which Kenyatta initially promised but which his allies are seeking 
to block, he will leave the party to form a rival alliance. This would represent a significant risk to 
national unity, as the coalition between Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, and Ruto, a Kalenjin, has helped to 
maintain an uneasy peace between two of the communities that experienced the worst violence 
during the post-election crisis of 2007/8. The country therefore faces a growing risk of both inter-
ethnic tension and the heavy-handed use of the security forces as the government seeks to 
maintain control. 
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Against this gloomy backdrop, Ethiopia offers a ray of hope following recent political openings. 
However, continued instability in parts of the country, and the threat of localized coups and 
insurrections, mean that Prime Minister Abiy faces a major challenge to simultaneously maintain 
political stability and push his reform agenda forwards. General elections scheduled for May 2020 
will present a major test of the government’s new direction, especially given the compressed 
timeframe to deliver more credible polls. In the absence of the necessary time to make wholesale 
institutional changes, much will depend on Abiy’s charisma and nous, and his capacity to retain the 
confidence of both the opposition and the different factions of the ruling Ethiopian People's 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). 
The situation is considerably more promising in Southern Africa, in part because the region already 
boasts a number of relatively stable democratic states. We are unlikely to see significant change in 
Mauritius and Namibia, while South Africa has the potential for democratic renewal now that Jacob 
Zuma has been replaced as president by Cyril Ramaphosa. However, the next two years will 
witness a significant test of the region’s democratic credentials where other countries are 
concerned. Malawi spent much of 2019 holding general elections and then debating the outcome. 
Following sustained street protests, first the Constitutional Court and second the Supreme Court 
ruled that the victory of President Peter Arthur Mutharika had been flawed. These proceedings led 
to a “fresh” (re-run) presidential election held in June 2020 that was won by the opposition, creating 
the opportunity for more systematic political change – a possibility that will be reviewed in the next 
BTI report. 
In Botswana, one of the continent’s oldest democracies, the dominance of the Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP) – which has ruled the country since independence – is less certain. The 
general elections in October 2019, which were among the most fiercely contested in the country's 
history, provided a foretaste of future political contests. The former BDP leader and President Ian 
Khama had quit the party in May 2019 and pledged that he would use all of his resources to 
ensure that the BDP would be defeated in the elections. Khama was angered that his handpicked 
successor, President Mokgweetsi Masisi, had refused to comply with his wishes. However, the 
fragmented opposition was comfortably beaten by President Masisi, whose populist promises of 
salary increases for civil servants and job creation in the electric car industry caught the popular 
imagination and handed his BDP an even higher vote share than in 2014. Nevertheless, the 
intensity of the campaign in 2019 raise serious questions about whether Botswana is entering a 
new phase of more fractious politics, and how the ruling party would respond to the prospect of 
losing power. 
Elections are also likely to generate fresh tensions in Zambia as the country prepares for polls in 
2021. The presidential race is set to be extremely close, as it was in 2016, especially given the 
poor state of the economy and mounting public dissatisfaction with the Patriotic Front (PF) 
government. As in Tanzania, President Lungu has demonstrated a growing intolerance of dissent 
and is likely to resort to greater use of repression if it looks like he is heading for defeat. Moreover, 
his government’s determination to force through controversial constitutional amendments – which 
critics allege would undermine the independence and impartiality of the judiciary – will further 
erode democratic checks and balances.  
Improvements in government performance are more likely to occur in countries that have recently 
experienced leadership changes, but even in these cases there are good reasons to be cautious. 
In both Angola and Zimbabwe, for example, it remains unclear just how much economic and 
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political reform will result from recent political transitions. Although hopes were initially higher in 
Zimbabwe following the overthrow of Robert Mugabe, it was in Angola that President Lourenço’s 
anti-corruption drive had the biggest impact on governance scores. However, there are significant 
causes for concern in both countries. In Angola, it is unclear whether Lourenço is genuinely 
committed to reform or is simply determined to replace the corrupt personalist networks that 
underpinned the dos Santos regime with those of his own. In Zimbabwe, the government has 
consistently repressed popular protests while failing to effectively address alleged human rights 
violations by members of the security forces, suggesting that Mnangagwa’s regime rests on very 
similar foundations to Mugabe’s. Popular aspirations for more fundamental political and economic 
transformation may therefore be disappointed in both countries. 
West Africa is also likely to witness more continuity than change. Despite this, popular perceptions 
of the ability of the region to establish stable democracies could be shaken if the recent trend of 
authoritarian abuses in Benin and Senegal, and rising corruption in Liberia, continues. Both Benin 
and Senegal have established strong democratic traditions, with multiparty politics in Senegal 
stretching back to the 1970s, when most African states were under one-party or military rule, and 
are widely seen to be leading the way in terms of political rights and civil liberties. However, the 
ability of presidents to manipulate elections in their favor by preventing opposition candidates and 
parties from standing has demonstrated the weakness of democratic institutions and the extent to 
which democracy depends on elite compliance in the absence of a strong civil society.  
Much as in the United States under President Donald Trump, the election of leaders willing to 
break with established conventions has demonstrated that many of the assumed “rules of the 
game” were not formal checks and balances that were stone and binding but were rather informal 
norms regarding how power should be exercised. The risk in both countries is therefore that the 
long periods of plural and peaceful politics that they have enjoyed has generated an unwarranted 
sense of complacency that these political systems will be self-correcting. Instead, the re-assertion 
of the primacy of democratic norms and values will require effective coalitions to be formed 
between civil society groups, opposition parties, regional bodies and members of the international 
community to both strengthen the independence of key institutions and increase the costs of 
subverting them. Democracy can never be assumed – it must always be fought for. 
Given its size and geo-strategic significance, overall trends in West Africa will also be strongly 
shaped by what happens in Nigeria. As things stand, there is little evidence that the country will 
make major strides towards reform under President Buhari – instead the current combination of 
gradual economic progress and bouts of excessive intervention by the security forces to deal with 
popular discontent is set to continue. One of the main challenges facing the government will be to 
establish and maintain a clear focus on policy priorities, especially given that Buhari is now in his 
second and final term and the succession battle to replace him has already begun. The country’s 
longer-term prospects will be heavily shaped by how the succession process plays out, and 
whether the next elections will be seen to be free and fair. In the light of opposition complaints 
about the 2019 polls, the government’s ability to simultaneously deal with Boko Haram, the Niger 
Delta insurgencies, and rising discontent in “Biafra”, will be undermined if the succession process 
saddles the ruling party with an unpopular leader who is only able to win by holding poor quality 
polls. 
Elsewhere, ongoing insurgencies threaten political stability in Cameroon and Mali, while the 
legitimacy of the state remains weak in a number of countries including Mauritania and Guinea. It 
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is in these states that rapid political change is most likely to occur in West Africa, as weak 
governments facing major governance challenges struggle to assert their authority. As we saw in 
Mali in 2012, the sitting government can be extremely vulnerable to both insurgencies and coups 
when political parties have relatively weak roots in society and the political system has failed to 
deliver security and development. It is therefore feasible that the next few years will see relative 
stability in most states go hand-in-hand with the collapse of regimes in countries where 
governance is already rated as “weak” or “failed”. 
Central Africa and the Sahel region have perhaps the greatest potential for this kind of political 
volatility. Conflict continues to be a major challenge in both the Central African Republic and Chad, 
while the government in Burkina Faso is still struggling to deal with the twin challenges of insecurity 
and poverty. As noted above, the creation of the G5, along with FC-G5 – its joint force – in 2017, 
has raised hopes that a more effective regional response will emerge, funded by international 
backers such as the United States and, through different modalities, the French. However, if 
foreign powers are not careful there is a risk that their tendency to focus on prioritize security 
concerns will lead to a short-termist approach being taken to the socio-economic development 
challenges facing countries in the Sahel. In the long-term, this is likely to not only to undermine the 
prospects for genuine economic transformation – which will require deep-rooted and structural 
changes that will take many years to complete – but also to alleviate the poverty and inequality that 
foster anti-system sentiment and movements. 
In the absence of an effective regional body, the tendency for conflicts to split across borders 
remains a serious source of concern. The most significant country from this point of view is the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, which has the capacity to negatively impact on its neighbors both 
in terms of the flow of refugees resulting from health crises and insecurity, and in terms of the way 
that nearby states have historically been sucked into conflicts on Congolese soil in search of 
valuable natural resources. Against this backdrop, it is particularly worrying that the DRC is 
currently struggling to contain the world’s second largest Ebola epidemic on record, which has 
already claimed over 2,000 lives. Failure to effectively contain and end the outbreak, which is 
located in the in the North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri provinces, would lead to a severe health crisis 
that would have dramatic economic and political consequences for both the DRC and the wider 
region. 
The political stability of the DRC will also depend on how the political alliance between current 
President Felix Tshisekedi and former President Joseph Kabila plays out. At present, relations 
appears to be cordial, in large part because Tshisekedi has kept his side of the deal, allowing his 
predecessor to wield considerable power from the shadows. The cabinet announced in August 
2019, for example, was dominated by Kabila’s Common Front for Congo (FCC), which took the 
most significant positions, with Tshisekedi's CACH coalition limited to less high-profile posts. 
However, on occasion Tshisekedi has also sought to flex his own muscles, rejecting Kabila’s first 
choice candidate for Prime Minister, Albert Yuma – the boss of Gécamines’ – and speaking of the 
need to “unblock the dictatorial system that was in place”. If Tshisekedi long-term goal is to 
gradually outmaneuver Kabila until the point that he can assert his independence, the country is 
likely to witness a prolonged power struggle with the potential to further destabilize the 
government. 
The one obvious reason for Tshisekedi to refrain from this course of action is that he remains 
dependent on Kabila to exercise authority. At present, Kabila enjoys a strong majority in both the 
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National and Provincial Assemblies and so has the capacity to effectively veto Tshisekedi’s policy 
agenda should he wish. Until the new president is able to gain greater control over the legislature 
this reality, along with Kabila’s powerful political and business networks, mean that any attempt to 
completely ditch the former leader would be extremely risky. In turn, this suggests that future 
legislative elections will be particularly fiercely contested given their significance to the balance of 
power between the two leaders, and hence to who is able to determine the country’s destiny. 
Taken together, the different trajectories of African states across the four regions covered by the 
BTI suggest that in many cases democratic gains and losses are likely to cancel one another out, 
much as they did in 2017-2019. 
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